At the 2025 RSA Conference, Andrea Little Limbago, PhD and SVP of Applied AI at Interos, delivered a sobering analysis of a new frontier in cybersecurity. Her session, titled “A Stuxnet Moment for Supply Chain Security?”, presented a chilling case study: the September 2024 “pager attacks,” where weaponised communication devices targeted Hezbollah operatives, resulting in deadly consequences. This incident is not only a snapshot of modern hybrid warfare—it’s a warning about the fragile integrity of global supply chains.
Supply chains as weapons
In this unprecedented case, a series of pagers and walkie-talkies—standard equipment in many conflict zones—were booby-trapped to explode upon use. What followed was a forensic trace through a tangled web of international suppliers:
Gold Apollo, a Taiwanese manufacturer, was identified as the origin of the pagers.
BAC Consulting, a Hungarian company claiming licensing rights, had no real infrastructure or verified operations.
Norta Global, based in Bulgaria and connected to a Norwegian national, was revealed to be a shell company with obscure links and no employees.
This triad of companies—operating across different jurisdictions, seemingly legitimate—demonstrates how easily opaque structures can be manipulated to infiltrate critical supply channels with lethal intent.
Echoes of Stuxnet
Limbago drew a powerful analogy to the 2010 Stuxnet cyberattack, which crippled Iran’s nuclear centrifuges. But unlike Stuxnet, which relied solely on digital sabotage, the pager attacks bridged cyber and kinetic warfare. This signals a dramatic shift: supply chains can now be both vectors and victims of physical and digital conflict.
The term “Stuxnet moment” is fitting. It marks a threshold—a crossing into a domain where civilian-grade technologies are co-opted for precision, covert, and devastating attacks. This is not theoretical; it is operational.
What this meaans for global security
The attacks challenge existing norms around attribution, legality, and cyber conduct. There is little precedent for handling such cases under international law, particularly when attribution is clouded by shell companies and transnational logistics.
Limbago emphasized that unless these issues are addressed, the normalization of such tactics is inevitable. The international community may find itself unprepared, both legally and technically, to confront these hybrid threats.
Securing the chain: key takeaways
To prevent further escalation and exploitation, several measures must become standard practice:
Radical Transparency: Implement full visibility into software and hardware component sourcing.
AI-Powered Monitoring: Use intelligent systems to flag anomalies and assess risk in real time.
Tougher Vetting: Strengthen protocols for evaluating supplier legitimacy across every node.
Global Coordination: Develop shared frameworks for information exchange and response across allied nations.
The “pager attacks” may well be remembered as a turning point—a demonstration that traditional and digital warfare have not only converged, but are now inseparable. The challenge ahead lies in securing what we too often take for granted: the very systems and supply chains that underpin our modern world.
The RSA Conference has once again illuminated a dark corner of cyber conflict. What we do next—policy-wise, technically, and diplomatically—will determine whether we meet the challenge or remain vulnerable to it.
